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 1 
Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options – A Celebration of Bill Stuntz 
(5/5/11) 
 
Prepared for presentation at the Harvard Law School Conference celebrating Bill Stuntz – March 






 The unity of Bill Stuntz’s character -- his profound integrity -- makes it easy to move 
from a celebration of his friendship (which I’ve treasured since we first met back in 1985) to one 
of his scholarship, for creativity, wisdom, and humility are strengths not just of Bill himself but 
of his work.  [This opening depends upon the sequence of essays in the volume.] Even as his 
broad brush strokes have fundamentally advanced our understanding of the interplay between 
substantive criminal law, criminal procedure, and criminal justice institutions over time, Bill’s 
work – like Bill himself – welcomes and endures sustained engagement.
1
  Humility is 
appropriate for me too as I offer some ruminations sparked by his scholarship.  The academic’s 
plight is to simultaneously worry about being uninteresting and about being wrong.  My hope is 
to err on the side of error.  And my methodology here will be much the same as it has been in a 
lot of my other work: I seek to entertain Bill, and perhaps to bait him into telling me why I’m 
wrong. 
 
 As Bill has noted, “criminal law’s breadth” – the sheer amount of conduct it subjects to 
penal sanctions – “has long been the starting point for virtually all the scholarship” in the field.
2
 
Back in 2001, he powerfully laid out the agency problems at the heart of the “pathologies” that 
inappropriately expand the range and depth of American criminal law:  “Legislators gain when 
they write criminal statutes in ways that benefit prosecutors.  Prosecutors gain from statutes that 
enable them more easily to induce guilty pleas.  Appellate courts lack the doctrinal tools to 
combat those tendencies.”
3
  Thereafter, Bill elaborated his model, distinguishing between 
                                                 
∗
 Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  Thanks to Alexandra Bowie, Adam Carlis, David 
Garland, Niki Lacey, Maximo Langer, Jerry Lynch, Maren Messing, Bill Simon, Peter Strauss, Bill Stuntz, Carol 
Steiker, Jim Whitman, and participants at two very helpful lunches with my colleagues and students at Columbia for 
extremely helpful comments; to Carol, Mike Klarman and David Skeel for putting on this celebration, and to Bill 
Stuntz for more than twenty-five years of friendship, inspiration, and humor. 
1
 See William J. Stuntz, Book Review: Christian Legal Theory, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1744 (2003) (“Imagine 
how differently most law review articles would read if their authors admitted the possibility that they might be 
mistaken.”); cf. Letter from Oliver Cromwell to the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland (Aug. 3, 1650), in The 
Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell 3022-03 (Wilbur Cortez Abbott ed., 1939) ("I beseech you, in the bowels 
of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken.").  When speaking of Bill, I’ve not altered the present tense in 
which this essay was written.  Bill will always live in his written work, in the minds (including mine) that he 
challenged to think harder, and in the people (including me) who loved him. 
2
 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 507 (2001) [hereinafter 
Stuntz, Pathological Politics]; see also Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law 
(Oxford 2008); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703 (2005); John Coffee, Does 
“Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. 
Rev. 193 (1991); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 Am. Crim. L. Q. 17 (1968). 
3
 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at 528. 
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federal and local political dynamics,
4
 and explaining how the loss of local democratic control 




 Bill has never suggested that these actors make their moves within a closed universe.  
Indeed, voters’ willingness to reward just about any legislation that increases the scope or depth 
of criminal law lies at the heart of his “pathology,”
6
 and he notes how “interest group pressure 
only aggravates the tendency toward ever broader liability rules.”
7
  At the core of his diagnostic 
story, however, is a narrative of how the institutional purposes of these actors are served by more 
criminal law (and perhaps more criminal enforcement) than is appropriate for a well-functioning 
society.  I suspect Bill’s focus is quite right: More punitive and broader penal sanctions 
certainly tend to increase the discretion of police officers and prosecutors and, under a 
constitutional regime of largely unfettered bargaining, can be cashed out for search and seizure 
authority, cheaper adjudications, agency prestige, political capital and the like.  That these 
transactions occur in a regime in which monitoring is particularly difficult makes them even 
more attractive to enforcement actors, for whom increased criminalization can thus become an 
unalloyed good. 
 
 Yet one might profitably supplement Bill’s insights into why institutional actors 
oversupply criminal law by exploring another, more perverse, reason why Americans are all too 
quick to resort to criminal statutes and actual prosecutions: Because criminal law offers a unique 
and unnecessarily bundled set of institutional and procedural characteristics for which there are 
no non-criminal substitutes, it frequently becomes a recourse – not a preferred choice -- when 
more effective and durable alternatives just aren’t available.  It’s troubling enough when a 
society over-criminalizes (by some unspecified metric) and over-punishes (by some unspecified 
metric).  It is even more troubling when we use criminal law not necessarily because we 
affirmatively want to but because it’s easier and cheaper than less punitive options. 
 
 To be sure, criminal law comes with some expensive appurtenances – also known as 
“fundamental constitutional rights” – that tend to limit recourse to it.  As Carol Steiker has so 
insightfully explained, by raising “the cost to government of using the criminal process,” the 
“revolution in criminal procedure” spearheaded by the Warren Court gave state and federal 
legislators good reason to devise civil avenues for attacking “what might be more plausibly 
classified as criminal conduct.”
8
  The chance to avoid adjudicative costs attributed to such 
criminal procedure rights as that to trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt will give a 
legislator or state official good reason to characterize a sanction or restraint as merely 
                                                 
4
 See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of 
Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2005). 
5
 William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1969 (2008); see also William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of 
American Criminal Justice (2011) (draft). 
6
 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at, 529-33. 
7
 Id. at 553. 
8
 Carol Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 Geo. 
L.J. 775, 780 (1997); see also Carol Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 771 (1998); 
Daniel Richman, United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of Regulatory Detention, in Criminal Procedure 
Stories (Carol Steiker, ed. 2006); Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 Duke L.J. 1321 (2008). 
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“regulatory” where all things are equal.  Yet all things are rarely equal, particularly when 
institutional context is considered.  My goal here is to explore the powerful countervailing 
forces that often make the criminal route more alluring – the forces that push legislators and 
enforcers to use criminal law in lieu of other possible interventions, not those that lead them to 
circumvent criminal protections by proceeding civilly.  (In a semi-perfect world, these 
countervailing forces would balance each other out.  We don’t live in that world.) 
   
 In addition to honoring Bill by adding a few brush strokes to his wonderful picture, I want 
to suggest that the solution to overcriminalization lies outside criminal law processes as well as 
within them.  The focus here will be to sketch out what moves in that direction would look 
like.
9
  Insightful and provocative work by David Garland, John Simon, Jim Whitman and 
others
10
 has quite properly focused on the cultural roots of our recourse to criminalization – and 
highly punitive criminalization at that.  Like Bill, however, I think institutional dynamics 
(spurred by cultural preferences that are not necessarily related to punishment itself) have far 
more explanatory power than is often appreciated.   
  
The Institutional “Definition” of What Is “Really” Criminal 
 
Had we an accepted metric for figuring out when conduct can properly be subjected to 
criminal sanctions and to what degree, guarding against overcriminalization would be a lot easier.  
Having one would perhaps not produce more reasoned decision making in our punishment of  
core crimes – murders, rapes, robberies and the like – but it would at least anchor our decisions 
about when criminal sanctions should be used as a tool of government power at border between 
“mere” regulation an prosecution.  Yet we lack any such metric.  Markus Dubber has plausibly 
suggested that the fault lies (at least in part) in the Anglo-American conflation of law and police 
power.
11
  Picking up on this point, Niki Lacey has noted the contrast with our more discerning 
cousins on the Continent, who worked hard to keep criminal law preoccupied with wrong-doing 
and culpability and relied on regulation to advance other state goals like risk-creation or public 
health.
12
  We made no effort in that regard and quietly allowed the police power to be 
“absorbed” within “law.”
13
  The result is intellectual chaos.  As Douglas Husak recently noted, 
                                                 
9
 While the focus here is on the United States, the argument that overcriminalization here is partially a function of 
peculiar doctrinal and institutional arrangements not found in, say, Europe, the approach may, in passing, offer some 
comfort to Europeans scared that they are on verge of taking “the punitive turn” down the American or English path.  
See Nicola Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies 
(2008).  But see David Downes, Contrasts in Toleration – 20 Years On (Dec. 2008 paper), available at 
http://vsr.ruhosting.nl/page24/files/Downes-ContrastsinTolerance.doc (suggesting that countries like the Netherlands, 
with “strongly social democratic political economies,” have not as yet taken the punitive turn). 
10
 For an excellent review essay, see James Q. Whitman, The Comparative Study of Criminal Punishment, 1 Ann. 
Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 17 (2005). 
11
See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government (2005). 
12
Lacey, supra note 9, at 104 (on the Continent “this location of regulatory offenses within the framework of criminal 
law ‘proper’ would be regarded as most unsatisfactory.  Rather than drawing the old police power within the 
modern framework of criminal justice, the modern governmental settlements of European codification of the early 
nineteenth century were inclined to separate out this form of social regulation within a discrete framework, leaving 
regulatory offenses as a more visible and autonomous manifestation of state power.”). 
13
Lacey supra note 9, at 102. 
 4 
“The absence of a viable account of criminalization constitutes the single most glaring failure of 




The scant attention Anglo-American legal development gave to drawing clear distinctions 
between the province of criminal law and that of civil regulation was partly a function of our 
general preference for procedural justice over a priori principles of substantive law.  As Bill has 
often noted, our Constitution has a lot to say about how criminal law should be enforced but little 
about what criminal law should be.  Our substantive criminal law therefore developed first 
through the case-by-case pronouncements of common law judges and then by the varied 
articulations of incensed legislators.  The Model Penal Code eventually offered theoretical rigor 
to receptive jurisdictions (a category that certainly does include the federal system).
15
  But even 
in those states, the Model Penal Code has had only limited effect on the “special part” of the 
penal code.
16
 To be sure, Continental systems – like those in Germany, France, and Italy -- will 
occasionally criminalize what we leave to regulation or tort, as the French have done with 
employment discrimination.
17
 And the coherence I see may just come from my distance and 
ignorance.  Yet one discerns an integrity in the substantive penal law of those countries that is 
sorely absent here.  Perhaps the same institutional self-confidence behind the commitment of 
inquisitorial systems to seek the “real truth” in their courts also supports an effort to 
systematically discern what really should be criminal.
18
  Here, we make it up as we go along. 
 
Our tolerance for theoretically unrestricted criminal law and our readiness to rely on 
criminal enforcement to advance a wide range of public policies is also a function of our 
historically weak “state”
19
 and the paucity of our institutional structures, i.e. the lack of 
regulatory actors other than cops, prosecutors and judges.  From the Founding – and long before 
in Britain
20
 – criminal justice institutions (however part-time) offered the promise of local 
control (through juries, venue rules, and decentralized enforcers) and the capacity for accepting 
                                                 
14
Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law 58 (Oxford 2008). 
15
 See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 15 (2006) (when setting contours of the duress defense under federal 
criminal law, Court gives “no weight” to the Model Penal Code formulation). 
16
 Gerard E. Lynch, Towards A Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 Buffalo 
Crim. L. Rev. 297, 299 (1998) (noting that the “Model Penal Code is a significantly less potent guide to the ‘special 
part’ of the criminal law today,” in part because “state legislatures have poured out new criminal statutes undreamed 
of by [that Code’s] drafters.”) 
17
 See Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 85 Wash. U. L. 
Rev. 1315 (2008); Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment Law: 
Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. 241 (2003). 
18
 See Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar 
Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 Boston College Int’l and Comp, L. Rev, 317, 353, 357 (1995) (noting the 
“[n]arrower scope of the criminal law,” in Germany as well as commitment of tribunal to “finding the truth”); see 
also Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How the French Do It, 
How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 539, 568 (1990) (similarly noting narrower 
scope of French criminal law). 
19
 For insightful counsel on how the term “state” should be used when referring to the United States in comparative 
terms, see Desmond King & Robert C. Lieberman, Ironies of States Building: Comparative Perspective on the 
American State, 61 World Politics 547 (2009). 
20
 See J.M. Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London 1660-1750 (2002); J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in 
England, 1660-1800 (1986); P. King, Crime, Justice and Discretion in England 1740-1820 (2000) 
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new responsibilities on a discretionary basis.
21
  These characteristics made them the perfect 
recourse for those who believed in minimal government, disdaining the interventionist Weberian 
bureaucracies of some other Western polities,
22
 but who periodically desired a law for “just this 
one bad thing” with an off-the-rack enforcement regime.  Darryl Brown recounts: “The early 
decades of the American republic continued earlier English and colonial practices of employing 
criminal law routinely as a means of local regulation.”
23
 Thereafter, efforts to identify and target 
vice in its many forms have played a remarkably large role in the growth of the criminal docket.  
As Bill notes in his masterful upcoming book: “Between the late 1870s and 1933, American’s 
criminal justice system fought a series of cultural battles in which criminal law – especially 
federal criminal law – was a key weapon: against polygamy, against state lotteries.., against 
prostitution, against opium-based drugs and, last, but definitely not least, against alcoholic 
drink.”
24
  Yet vice is not the whole story.  One also sees an easy creep from more mundane 
regulation to criminalization in United States v. Grimaud,
25
 the watershed case upholding the 
constitutionality of administrative crimes.
26
  It arose out of the 1908 federal criminal 
prosecution of a California shepherd for violating the Interior Department’s national forest 
grazing regulations.  The 1897 legislation authorizing the Interior Department to promulgate 
regulations to protect the lands under its stewardship had left it free to use either civil or criminal 
sanctions.
27
  Thereafter, when the newly created Forest Service – led by the able Gifford 
Pinchot, who carefully nurtured his ties to the Attorney General
28
 – assumed Interior’s 
responsibilities and found civil injunctions inadequate, it simply prevailed on the Justice 
Department to replead the regulatory violations in grand jury indictments.
29
  While the New 
Deal and the growth of the administrative state brought a conspicuous proliferation of public 
welfare offenses within the federal system, that proliferation thus had begun decades before.  As 
early as 1933 a canny observer like Francis Sayres could already worry about the upcoming flood 
that threatened to erase what was left of the civil-criminal divide.
30
   
                                                 
21
 Eric Monkkonen notes how the Boston sewer department was essentially spun out of the city marshal’s service in 
1837.  Eric H. Monkkonen, Police in Urban America, 1860-1920, at 47 (2004 ed.) (noting how when Boston 
incorporated in 1822, the city marshal was given general responsibility for matters affecting the “health, security, and 
comfort of the city,” and that “[t]he only change in the power of the Boston marshal came in 1837, when the city 
created a separate department of sewers, run by a former deputy marshal.”).  
22
 See Desmond King & Robert C. Lieberman, supra note 19, at 573-74 (“A well-rehearsed motif in American 
political culture is that of being a strong nation with a weak state whose citizens prize decentralization and localism, 
that is, a political system less centralized, less interventionist, and less Weberian than that found in comparable 
advanced democracies, including some with strong federal systems such as Australia or Germany.”). 
23
 Darryl K. Brown, Yick Wo and the Constitutional Regulation of Criminal Law, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1405, 1407. 
24
 William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, 161? (2011) (draft). 
25
 220 U.S. 506 (1911). 
26
 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn T. Watts, Agency Rules with Force of Law, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 501-02 
(2002) ("Grimaud thus established what Congress could do: it could delegate power to an agency to adopt 
regulations subject to criminal penalties, provided that Congress itself legislated the penalties."). 
27
 See Logan Sawyer, Grazing, Grimaud, and Gifford Pinchot: How the Forest Service Overcame the Classical 
Nondelegation Doctrine to Establish Administrative Crimes, 24 J. L. & Pol. 171, 184 (2008). 
28
 Id. at 193. 
29
 Id. at 184-202. 
30 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 84 (1933) (“With respect to public 
welfare offenses involving light penalties the abandonment of the classic requirement of mens rea is probably a 
 6 
Lacking any commonly accepted intellectual basis for distinguishing the appropriate 
realm of criminal prosecutions from that of other government interventions, we ended up, by 
default, with an institutional definition. Over time, criminal law in the United States became 
what criminal justice actors did, nothing more.   
 
Why Criminalization Will be Sought by Those Who Might Prefer Something Else 
 
 Conceptually, we thus have an inexhaustible supply of criminal law in the United States.  
As a constitutional matter too, thanks to the Framer’s preoccupation with criminal procedure.  
Although Bill has given us a provocative glimpse of “a kind of criminal substantive due process” 
that would ensure that “the conduct criminalized was serious enough to justify some criminal 
punishment,”
31
 this is not a doctrinal dog likely to bark in the foreseeable future (although every 
so often, it gets up and walks around).
32
  As a result, the federal government and the States are 
thus substantially free to impose the same stigma and sanctions on the violator of any social 
policy that they impose on the robber, rapist, or murderer (with the exception of capital 
punishment).  And they can use the same cops, prosecutors, and courts to do so. 
 
 The supply of actual criminal enforcement is of course not inexhaustible.  Cops and 
prosecutors are expensive, as are prisons.  (Particularly prisons, when you think about it.)  Yet 
these very limits, when combined with the strong norms of police and prosecutorial discretion 
that characterize American criminal enforcement and the opacity that insulates prosecutorial 
decision making from scrutiny,
33
 have ended up promoting the extension of criminal law’s 
domain.  Like those magic bags that seem to hold everything the magician puts in them without 
getting bigger, criminal justice institutions seem able to assume any number of new assignments 
without necessarily acting on them.  Such is the value of decentralized and highly discretionary 
authority.  And because of our reliance on general jurisdiction criminal enforcement institutions, 
the mere bringing of a criminal case entails a powerful statement of the condemned conduct’s 
worthiness for criminal treatment. 
 
 That a single institution at each level of government should – with notable exceptions -- 
have responsibility for all criminal prosecutions is something we take for granted, but shouldn’t. 
Our readiness to extend criminal law beyond “core” harm-based concerns
34
 did not necessarily 
(at least as an a priori matter) have to be accompanied by the assignment of these extended 
criminal functions to the same general jurisdiction enforcement agencies that handle regular 
crimes (murders, rapes, robberies, and the like).  One could imagine a system of subject-specific 
investigators bringing cases to “special” prosecutors housed in stand-alone agencies with limited 
                                                                                                                                                             
sound development. But courts should scrupulously avoid extending the doctrines applicable to public welfare 
offenses to true crimes. To do so would sap the vitality of the criminal law.”). 
31
 William J. Stuntz, Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 66 (1997). 
32
 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); California v. Lambert, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
33
 See James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. Legal Analysis 119 
(2009). 
34
 See generally Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 755 (2004) (discussing ways to 
distinguish the "core" of criminal law from its "periphery"); see also Douglas Husak, 29 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 169, 
171 (2009) (referring to "offences such as murder, rape, theft and the like" as the "core of the criminal law"). 
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missions.  In such a world, specialized enforcement agencies could be equipped with 
specialized investigative and enforcement tools keyed to their particular subject matter; 
prosecutors could even bring cases in special courts.  We have largely rejected or ignored that 
model, however.
35
  Within the federal system, most prosecutions are brought by generalist U.S. 
Attorneys.  Even the Justice Department's specialized litigating divisions (like those for 
Antitrust, Civil Rights and Tax) are housed within an agency that has general federal criminal 
jurisdiction.  Similarly, in the States, the vast majority of prosecutors are in general jurisdiction 
district attorneys offices and bring cases before general jurisdiction criminal judges.
36
  Sure, 
prosecutors within the larger offices sometimes specialize, sometimes in units that proclaim their 
dedication to particular kinds of cases.  And at the local level, some jurisdictions have 
experimented with specialty drug, gun and domestic violence courts.
37
  Yet it is a fundamentally 
generalist system.  Moreover, everywhere, trials (to the extent they occur) will be before the 
ultimate general jurisdiction players:  lay jurors whose response to the evidence (and readiness 





 Consider how this institutional design affects the prosecution of offenses outside core 
criminality:  A fraud or “public welfare” offense will usually be pursued with resources (and by 
prosecutors) that could just as easily be used against rapes, robberies, and murders, and by 
prosecutors and enforcement personnel who may have just gone after such obviously “real” 
crimes.
39
  And the reputational capital that an agency develops going after “real” crimes gets 
deployed – consciously or not – across all the criminal cases it brings.
40
  No prosecutor would 
be so stupid as to explicitly analogize a securities fraud or environmental crime to murder, rape, 
or terrorism at a press conference, arraignment, or trial.  Nor will anyone confuse Martha 
Stewart with Matty “the Horse” Ianniello of the Genovese Family.  But the announcement that 
                                                 
35
 But see Luis A. Aguilar, Speech at North American Securities Administrators Ass’n’s Winder Enforcement 
Conference, Empowering the Markets Watchdog to Effect Real Results, Jan. 10, 2009 (SEC commissioner argues 
“that Congress could greatly enhance enforcement of the securities laws by authorizing the Commission to prosecute 
criminal violations of the federal securities laws where the Department of Justice declines to bring an action.”), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch011009laa.htm 
36
 For a survey of the degree to which state attorneys general get involved in what otherwise would be local 
prosecutions, see Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 
Mich. L. Rev. 519 (2010). 
37
 See generally Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to 
Institutionalization, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1501 (2003); Phyllis Skloot Bamberger, Specialized Courts: Not a 
Cure-All, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1091 (2003). 
38
 See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 Va. L. 
Rev. 939, 971-73 (1997) (citing studies). 
39
 See Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, from The Law of Violence (forthcoming Oxford 
University Press) “In the criminal law, violent crime seems to verify the need for, and justice of, the state’s own 
violence in policing and punishment.”), available at www.law.berkeley.edu/img/Ristroph(1).pdf; see also James Q. 
Whitman, The Comparative Study of Criminal Punishment, 1 Ann. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 17, 29-30 (2005) (discussing 
relationship between criminal punishment and social traditions of violence). 
40
 The same sort of cross-subsidy has historically supported extensions of federal criminal jurisdiction.  See 
Kathleen J. Frydl, Kidnapping and State Development in the United States, 20 Stud. in Am. Pol. Dev. 18, 20 (2006) 
(“The quintessential crime against the person, kidnapping, furnished opportunity to those eager to project the formal 
power of the state.”). 
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an indictment has been issued in a securities fraud case is made from the same podium as an 
announcement that a mob boss has been convicted.  The police or federal agents will wear will 
the same bedizened raid jackets as they cart boxes out of a hedge fund or counterfeit handbag 




In this world, the decisions prosecutors and other enforcers make and the actions they 
take speak far more loudly than legislative criminalization.  This difference in expressive 
capacities arises for a number of reasons.  For one thing, because criminal laws aren’t 
self-executing, and we lack the German “principle of legality” that compels prosecution, a penal 
provision may never have a life beyond the penal code.  Yes, a legislator’s campaign literature 
will tout her sponsorship of the “Get Tough on [Fill in the Blank] Act,” but that marginal 
contribution to the thickness of the statute book likely has little more salience than a bridge 
funded or defense contract obtained.  It is often only after a prosecutor takes action that a statute 
– particularly one drafted some years earlier – enters the public consciousness.  Moreover, when 
a prosecutor invokes a provision, she will always do so in the context of facts that she can select 
for their moral appeal.
42
  This both enables the prosecutor to shape the contours of the doctrine 
and ensures maximum pressure behind the expansion of the criminal law.  In the end, though, 
much of the power of the speech comes from the identity of the speaker: Although generalist 
prosecutors may lack the specialized knowledge of their regulatory brethren across the 
civil-criminal divide, they are far better placed to make trans-substantive claims of moral 
blameworthiness.
43
 And since prosecutors have more “skin” in the game, because of the 
opportunity costs of their cases, their claims of “criminality” have far more power to transform 
social norms than the assertions of a legislature that has an infinite supply of such epithets.
44
   
                                                 
41
 See Caaldarola v. County of Westchester, 343 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2003) (dismissing civil claim of corrections 
officers complaining about videotaped “perp walk” following their arrest for disability benefit fraud).  The court 
noted: 
The "perp walk," that is, when an accused wrongdoer is led away in handcuffs by the police to 
the courthouse, police station, or jail, has been featured in newspapers and newscasts for decades. The 
normally camera-shy arrestees often pull coats over their heads, place their hands in front of their faces, or 
otherwise attempt to obscure their identities. A recent surge in "executive perp walks" has featured accused 
white collar criminals in designer suits and handcuffs. Whether the accused wrongdoer is wearing a 
sweatshirt over his head or an Armani suit on his back, we suspect that perp walks are broadcast by 
networks and reprinted in newspapers at least in part for their entertainment value. Yet, perp walks also 
serve the more serious purpose of educating the public about law enforcement efforts. The image of the 
accused being led away to contend with the justice system powerfully communicates government efforts to 
thwart the criminal element, and it may deter others from attempting similar crimes. 
Id. at 572-73. 
42
 See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 480 ("By paying close 
attention to the facts of the cases they select as vehicles for novel statutory readings, federal prosecutors can 
highlight the benefits and suppress the costs of the interpretations that they favor.").  
43
 See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 L. & Contemp. Probs. 23, 
54 (1997) (“The EPA or SEC lawyer may be better able to compare each case with other violations of securities or 
environmental laws, in terms of its importance to operating honest capital markets or protecting environmental 
quality, but the prosecutor is better equipped to compare the violation with other types of crime in terms of the moral 
blameworthiness of conduct, the degree of departure from general standards of citizenship, and the equity of 
imposing stigmatizing punishment.”). 
44
 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Institutional Logic of Preventive Crime 34 (2008) (“Unlike other agencies, 
the bureaucracies charged with crime prevention are likely to enjoy a greater degree of political insulation and 
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 The unique expressive capabilities of those who actually bring cases can be misused.  As 
Bill has pointed out, prosecutors may have reasons for deploying the “criminal” label that have 
little do with culpability or social harm and much to do with building institutional or political 
capital.  There may be short-term political gains – to the prosecutor personally or to her office – 
from putting all sorts of temporary “public enemies” on the same moral plane as “other” 
criminals.  Moreover, the implicit or explicit claim that “crimes are crimes” can end up being a 
bridge too far.  Early in the New Deal – a time when criminal law was increasingly used as the 
leading edge for federal regulatory regimes -- the A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation in 
Brooklyn emerged as a serious threat to the National Recovery Administration’s program for the 
notoriously corrupt kosher poultry business.  Government inspectors found serial violations of 
the Live Poultry Code’s wage and hour provisions, sales of unfit and uninspected poultry, and 
they were themselves threatened with violence as they pursued these problems.
45
  The Justice 
Department obtained an indictment against the four Schechter brothers and their firm on sixty 
criminal counts, gained a conviction on nineteen counts, and an affirmance on appeal.
46
  When 
the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice McReynolds got defense counsel to explain the 
poultry’s code’s “straight killing” requirement – the seller was supposed to put his hand in the 
coop and take the first chicken he touched – then commented “'And it was for that your client 
was convicted?’”  Counsel replied: “'Yes, and fined and given a jail sentence.’”
47





 Still, the idea that a prosecutor’s office – not the courtroom or the criminal code
49
 – is the 
place where discussions about what is “really” criminal runs deep.  Particularly in the rarified 
world of white collar enforcement that Kenneth Mann and Jerry Lynch have captured so 
insightfully,
50
 the standard defense pitch starts by explaining how the alleged conduct, though 
“technically” covered by a criminal provision does not rise to the level of a “real” crime.   
Indeed, this tack is pursued to a fault.
51
 
                                                                                                                                                             
influence owing to the perceived sensitivity of their law enforcement missions and their ability to strategically 
leverage responsibilities widely perceived as involving high social value.”). 
45
 See Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 87 (1982) 
46
 United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1935), rev’d, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  The 
Second Circuit opinion in Schechter was written by Judge Martin Manton, who had just missed being appointed to 
the Supreme Court, and who later became the first federal judge convicted of receiving bribes.  United States v. 
Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939) (affirming conviction); see also David R. Stras, Pierce Butler:  A Supreme 
Technician, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 695, 710 n.112 (2009).  Bill loved these sorts of details.  Bill recently reminded me 
that another of his favorite New Deal cases, the “Hot Oil” case, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), 
arose out of a National Industrial Recovery Act regime that threatened code violators with criminal prosecution.  
For a lovely tour of the criminal law in the midst of changes brought by its deployment for regulatory purposes, see 
Livingston Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes: 1887-1936, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 618 (1937). 
47
 Irons, supra note 45, at 99. 
48
 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (finding poultry industry regulations to be 
outside Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and to be unconstitutional delegations of congressional power). 
49
 The federal system doesn’t even have a formal criminal code, since codifiers have never been able to wrangle all 
the U.S. Code’s penal provisions into a single title. 
50
 See Kenneth Mann, Defending White-Collar Crime (1985); see also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System 
of Criminal Justice, 66 Ford. L. Rev. 2117 (1998).  
51
 Two former executives at the Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney’s office recently noted: “In our 
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 The thickness of the prosecutorial portfolio, the privileged status of certain of its 
component parts (violent crime, treason, et al.), and the opacity of the criminal enforcement 
regime can have material, as well as expressive, consequences.  Consider the effects on 
investigative or prosecutorial tactics.  A standard story starts when some technique or tactic is 
rolled out and authorized for an especially egregious offense – terrorism or child pornography, 
for instance.  Over time, the argument “isn’t [some other] offense just as bad” gains power, 
particularly when accompanied by the assumption that enforcers will pick out only the really 
“bad” instances of the new offense.  Prosecutors or agents/police who move from one unit to 
another will tout the virtues of the new tool, but word will get out even without personnel shifts 
because of the common hierarchy and culture.  Before long, the extraordinary tactic becomes 
just another criminal enforcement tool.  Outside the federal system, the vehicular stops that the 
police make for felonies soon get made for misdemeanors.
52
  Within the federal system, USA 
PATRIOT ACT subpoenas get used in cases having nothing to do with terrorism,
53
 and insider 
trading cases get investigated with the sort of electronic surveillance previously reserved for 
mobsters and drug traffickers.
54
  While none of these tactics is necessarily inappropriate on the 
facts, the pooling of criminal cases without the slightest concern for proportionality can be 
disconcerting.  This is doubly true when the criminal law has expanded beyond into realms 
traditionally enforced by civil law.   
 
 Showing a causal link is difficult, especially when one tries to connect constitutional 
development to political change and bureaucratic choice.  Yet I wonder whether the creep of 
enforcement tactics from one offense to another not just mirrors, but is actually promoted by, the 
“transsubstantive” state of criminal procedure doctrine that Bill has rightfully highlighted.
55
  
That courts draw no “distinctions among crimes . . . when it comes to regulating criminal 
investigations,”
56
 surely affects the calculus of enforcers deciding whether to import a tactic 
from one area to another. 
                                                                                                                                                             
experience, it is not uncommon for defense counsel to seek non-criminal or deferred resolutions when, in view of the 
charging precedent of the office, prosecutorial practice and the facts and circumstances of the case, such request is 
not realistic.”  See Lev L. Dassin and Guy Petrillo, Pre-Charge Presentations to a U.S. Attorney’s Office and the 
Department of Justice (2010) (draft).    
52
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police 
Constitutional Carte Blanche, 77 Ind. L.J. 419, 458 (2002) (“[B]y disavowing any need to correlate reasonableness 
with offense gravity, the Atwater majority missed an opportunity to provide legislatures with an incentive to 
undertake critical reexaminations of their criminal codes, a task that is long overdue”); see also Sameer Bajaj, Note: 
Policing the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Warrantless Investigatory Stops for Past Misdemeanors, 
109 Colum. L. Rev. 309 (2009). 
53
 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes from Drugs to Swindling, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 
2003 (detailing federal government expansive application of investigatory powers granted to it under the USA 
PATRIOT Act); see also Risa Berkower, Sliding Down a Slippery Slope? The Future Use of Administrative 
Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2251 (2005) (explaining the increasing availability of 
administrative subpoenas to criminal investigators). 
54
 See Peter J. Henning, White Collar Watch: Using Drug War Methods to Look for Insider Trading, N.Y.Times, 
Sept. 30, 2010, at F7. 
55
 William J. Stuntz, O. J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 
842 (2001).  
56
 Id. at 843. 
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 The ability of agencies that pursue “real” crime to attract and maintain funding and 
resource commitments also has repercussions outside the core.  Public safety is not exactly a 
non-negotiable part of governmental budgets.  Indeed, it has been interesting to watch state and 
local governments cut back on their criminal justice expenditures in the wake of the recent 
economic downturn.
57
  But support for general criminal enforcement agencies – local police and 
prosecutors; the FBI and federal prosecutors – certainty has a durable strength that agencies 
lacking their core crime portfolio can only envy.  And the relative opacity of those agencies, the 
high fixed cost of the informational networks (i.e. the local police patrol beat; the federal 
relationships with local enforcers), and the apparently low marginal cost of extending beyond the 
core crime mission means that even when funding for some government mission lags (perhaps 
because of shifting political preferences), criminal prosecutors will remain potential actors. 
 
 Notice the two steps of the problem: Lacking any clear understanding of what ought to be 
criminalized, we have opted for an institutional definition.  This is not in of itself indefensible.  
However intellectually unsatisfying this approach may be to moral retributivists or adherents to 
Becker and Posner,
58
 there is something to be said for expanding the sanction curve and leaving 
prosecutors to make the granular determinations not amenable to easy legislative specification: 
while crack houses are usually targeted civilly, the owner of this particular one should face 
criminal charges; while the SEC generally brings civil enforcement actions against insider traders, 
this particular group should be prosecuted for criminal securities fraud. Yet in combination with 
a second aspect of our system -- our reliance on relatively high-status general criminal 
jurisdiction institutions – we end up with a dangerous political dynamic that makes criminal 
enforcement the envy of anyone with a policy agenda -- even a policy agenda that, all things 
being equal, they would have preferred to pursue with some other form of governmental action.  
The intervention of agencies that, via legislative and theoretical abdication, we have placed in 
charge of sorting for “real” criminality will thus often be sought less for features intrinsic to 
criminalization than for those that have been bundled into criminal enforcement only 
contingently. 
 
 The problem occurs at all levels of government and is not new.  Decades ago, Sanford 
Kadish bemoaned how the criminal process had become “overburdened” by the imposition on 
prosecutors and police of the duty to provide various “social services to needy segments of the 
community.”
59
  Although the obligation to pursue non-support complaints, he noted, “is 
performed by police and prosecutors with some success, it is done reluctantly and usually less 
effectively than by a civil agency especially designed to handle the service.  In addition, it is 
performed at a sacrifice to those primary functions of protecting the public against dangerous and 
                                                 
57
 See Judith Greene & Marc Mauer, Downscaling Prisons: Lessons from Four States (Sentencing Project 2010); 
Pew Center on the States, Prison Count 2010: State Population Declines for the First Time in 38 Years (March 
2010). 
58
 Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of 
Criminal Sanctions, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 417 (1980), with Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar 
Criminals, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 409 (1980), and Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 
J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). 
59
 Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 Am. Crim. L. Q. 17, 27-28 (1968). 
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threatening conduct which only the criminal law can perform.”
60
  As Kadish surely recognized, 
however, any such civil agency would face vagaries of public funding and political support that 
criminal justice agencies would never face.  Perhaps the relative sanctity of criminal justice 
expenditures (at least until the current recession) is endemic to California.  Exploring how 
California prosecutors have been using statutory rape charges as leverage for child support 
payments, Kay Levine recently noted: “In an age where funding for social services is constantly 
on the decline and law and order programs seem to be the only measures garnering bipartisan 
support, criminal justice agencies may be the only institutions with the financial resources to take 
on seemingly intractable social problems.”
61
  Yet Jonathan Simon (writing from California) has 
plausibly suggested the phenomenon is national, reporting that “prosecutors operating mainly at 
the local level have found themselves pulled to act in a wider sphere of governance that was 




Not only will funding be stickier when a policy is pitched as a criminal enforcement 
project but it will come with institutional and fiscal multipliers because of the priority that other 
organizations, public and private, give to cooperation with crime-fighting institutions.  Consider 
Nancy Wolf’s account of mental health courts: “By invoking the court’s power and legitimacy 
[and presumably that of the prosecutors bringing the cases], mental health courts may more 
effectively jump queues or circumvent access barriers and, as such, be more successful in getting 
mentally ill offenders into treatment.”
63
  Or consider the allure of “community prosecutors,” 
whose status often allows them to leap bureaucratic boundaries and deploy (without themselves 




We see the same phenomenon on the federal side, particularly in the white collar area.  
Even as the Bush Administration’s ambivalence about financial regulation led to diminished 
numbers and zeal among front-line investigators at the Securities and Exchange Commission,
65
 
federal prosecutors were racking up convictions in financial fraud prosecutions and the Justice 
                                                 
60
 Id. at 30. 
61
 See Kay Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1125, 1211 (2005). 
62
 Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and 
Created a Culture of Fear 72 (2007). 
63
 Nancy Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents: Thinking Past the Novelty of Mental Health Courts, 30 J. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry L. 431, 433 (2002). 
64
 See Cecelia Klingele, Michael S. Scott, Walter J. Dickey, Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 Wisc. L. Rev. 953, 
981 (2010) (noting that “prosecutors possess a level of credibility and moral authority within many communities that 
could enable them to engage members of the community in active partnerships and to garner support for new 
initiatives”); Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How Federal Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent Crime, 24 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 573, 605 (1999) (“It is not that the prosecutors will run the after-school programs, but rather they 
have the wherewithal to bring to the table the front-line service providers who know how to make the world of 
legitimate work more attractive to [] children than the world of their drug-dealing friends.”);  
65
 See General Accountability Office, Securities and Exchange Commission: Greater Attention Needed to Enhance 
Communication and Utilization of Resources in the Division of Enforcement, 17-24 (March 2009), available at 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d09358.pdf ; Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Inspector General, Program 
Improvements Needed Within the SEC’s Division of Enforcement (Sept. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec-oig.gov/AuditsInspections/Reports.html.  See also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff 
Scandal: Three Narratives in Search of a Story, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 899. 
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Department was touting their successes.
66
  To be sure, prosecutors faced competing criminal 
enforcement priorities
67
 and had to do some back-peddling in response to congressional 
concerns about over-aggressive enforcement.
68
  But they were far more insulated from 
deregulatory pressures than their SEC cousins.  And anyone wanting more zealous public 
enforcement in the capital markets during the Bush years (the lack of which we are now coming 





Then there are the cheer-leaders for criminal enforcement that come from the ranks of 
those who want less government intervention, not more.  Take public corruption.  The mantra 
of opponents to campaign finance or lobbying reform – whether in Washington, D.C. or a state 
capital – is that the bad behavior that reform proposals would target through prophylactic regimes 
can simply be prosecuted, should actual instances occur.
70
  They drive the point home by 
regularly passing overlapping criminal statutes that explicitly target the bad behavior.  So too 
with gun regulation, where the need for state and federal prosecutions of gun-toting felons has 
been a key plank of anti-firearms regulation forces.
71
  Note how the best-case scenarios for a 
regulatory regime can thus be picked off and assigned to the criminal process.  
 
Criminalization – not just symbolic legislation but actual prosecutions – has thus become 
a sweet spot for both those favoring maximal government action and those favoring minimal.  
Rather than offering an extreme option in a graduated spectrum of sanctions and regulatory 
                                                 
66
 See Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions, 58 Duke L.J. 2087 (2009).  
67
 See Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 
DePaul L. Rev. 295, 314 n.90 (2008) (highlighting sketchy and somewhat contradictory evidence as to the extent of 
criminal resources committed to white collar prosecutions during the Bush Administration). 
68
 Id. at 297-302 (recounting Bush Administration’s response to congressional concerns about Justice Department’s 
corporate attorney-client privilege waiver policies). 
69
 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229 (2007) 
(highlighting value of public enforcement). 
70
 See, e.g., Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 642 (1996) (Thomas, J. 
concurring) (quoting with approval the argument by appellants in Buckley v. Valeo:  "If a small minority of political 
contributions are given to secure appointments for the donors or some other quid pro quo, that cannot serve to justify 
prohibiting all large contributions, the vast majority of which are given not for any such purpose but to further the 
expression of political views which the candidate and donor share. Where First Amendment rights are involved, a 
blunderbuss approach which prohibits mostly innocent speech cannot be held a means narrowly and precisely 
directed to the governmental interest in the small minority of contributions that are not innocent." (quoting Brief for 
Appellants in Buckley v. Valeo, O. T. 1975, Nos. 75-436 and 75-437, pp. 117-118); Testimony of Roger Pilon, Cato 
Institute, before the House Committee on House Administration: Constitutional Issues Related to Campaign Finance 
Reform (July 22, 1999) (1999) (“If there is quid-pro-quo corruption, then let the Justice Department investigate it. 
All the evidence suggests, however, that money buys access, it does not buy votes.”), available at 
http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-rp072299.html; see also Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 
876, 908 (2010) (in course of striking down campaign finance restrictions, Court notes that bribery laws cover quid 
pro quo arrangements). 
71
 See Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile" and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 369 (2001); see also Jackie Calmes, Administration Invites N.R.A.to Meet on Gun Policies, But It Declines, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2011, at A24 (noting, in connection with efforts by the White House to reach out to the NRA, 
that President Obama’s recent column had “emphasized, ‘First we should begin by enforcing laws that are already on 
the books”’– a line long used by the gun lobby.”). 
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choices, criminal prosecution ends up as the natural point of first resort for all too many players 
of this perverse political game.  And the odds become slim that actual enforcement patterns – 
the institutional choices that we rely on in lieu of serious thinking about the criminal/civil divide 
– will reflect a serious engagement with overcriminalization concerns. 
 
 One can argue that criminal prosecutions are simply the gold standard for state action in 
the United States, and that the centrality (and severity) of penal sanctions are just features of the 
larger “culture of control” that David Garland has so insightfully explored.
72
  Yet, as Garland 
himself has noted, we should attend to the structural and political sources that contribute to our 
distinct culture.
73
  The (tentative) suggestion here is that the historically contingent institutional 
arrangements highlighted above are more a cause than an effect of that culture (though they are 
probably both).  At the very least, we should recognize how our distinct institutional 
mechanisms reinforce the social dynamics that social theorists have sketched out. And we 
certainly ought to do so before making broad claims that American penal policy is “but the 
pretext and springboard for a broader remaking of the perimeter and functions of the state.”
74
    
 
Relieving the Demand 
 
 Just as consideration of how criminal law and its enforcement become a resort for those 
for whom the stigma and punishment are but side-effects of an institutional preference makes the 
pathologies of criminal law seem even worse than Bill has portrayed, so too might it offer new 
avenues for relief.  Bill has suggested that the overcriminalization problem could be solved 
either by deregulating criminal procedure or by constitutionalizing the borders of criminal law.
75
  
Perhaps there is another avenue, more true to our process-orientation:  reducing the allure of 
criminal law by providing institutional alternatives to prosecution, and giving those institutions 
sufficient insulation from the ebb and flow of political preferences that they remain effective 
alternatives even in the lean years. 
 
 Criminal enforcers (tautologically) have a monopoly over the state’s harshest coercive 
sanctions.  Against whom should this sanction be deployed?  That question – extended to 
include all instrumental uses of criminal sanctions, including information gathering – ought to be 
at the heart of any discussion about what conduct should be criminalized and to what extent.  If 
we are not going to be systematic in having such a discussion, we might still – at least in theory 
-- obtain a regime reflecting revealed societal preferences by relying on the choices made by 
accountable enforcement agencies.  When criminal sanctions are simply the second-best 
preference of those who would prefer a regulatory, social services, or some other non-criminal 
                                                 
72
 David Garland, Culture of Control (2001). 
73
 See David Garland, Concepts of Culture in the Sociology of Punishment, 10 Theoretical Criminology 419, 437 
(2006).  
74
 Loïc Wacquant, “The Place of the Prison in the New Government of Poverty,” 23, 24, in After the War on Crime: 
Race, Democracy, and a New Reconstruction (Marie-Louie Frampton, Ián Haney López and Jonathan Simon, eds.) 
(2008); see also Loïc Wacquant. Ordering Insecurity: Social Polarization and the Punitive Upsurge, 11 Radical 
Philosophy Review 9 (2008). I’m grateful to Jim Whitman and David Garland for pointing me toward Wacquant’s 
work. 
75
 William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 29 (1996). 
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regime, but can’t obtain it, that regime is unattainable, and overcriminalization – however 
normatively measured – is bound to occur.  That our harshest sanctions are used only because 
less harsh alternatives are unavailable – that certain securities fraud cases are prosecuted because 
public and private civil enforcement are underfunded or procedurally obstructed;
76
 that drug 
treatment is more easily provided to addicts who are prosecuted than to those who simply seek 
help – makes no sense at all.  We therefore ought to try to reduce this overuse by addressing the 
ways in which criminalization can crowd out and displace non-criminal processes and 
institutions.  
 
 One key to such demand reduction lies in recognizing the features we have bundled 
together with criminal sanctions that need not be exclusive to that regime.  Sometimes 
unbundling will be particularly hard because of the relationship that Bill has highlighted between 
criminal defense rights and exercises of government power.  Because criminal defendants have 
speedy trial rights that civil parties lack, criminal cases will be on a fast adjudication track that 
regulatory action can’t match.  Criminal proceedings will also dominate where potential 
informational sources can invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, since 
the threat of prosecution (or the promise of immunity against prosecution) will be a powerful 
information-forcing tool.  Yet we could do a lot more to bridge the huge gap between civil 
information-gathering mechanisms and the search warrants, grand jury subpoenae, and other such 
tools currently available only to prosecutors. 
 
 I suspect, for example, that a truly independent ethics commission with adequate 
resources and subpoena power would not be able, by itself, to clear up the self-dealing in Albany, 
Springfield, or any other state capital in the intense competition for “most corrupt.”
77
  Because 
the most troubling transactions are those about which participants are least likely to tell the truth, 
even under oath, only the threat or reality of criminal prosecution and imprisonment will likely 
shake this information loose.  (Bill would probably have argued that anti-snitching norms are 
now stronger in state capitals than in some Mafia families.  But he could be harsh.)  Yet 
subpoena power and the manpower to analyze compelled disclosures might well make recourse 
to the criminal law less necessary, particularly if given to an agency with the esprit and 
professionalism to make use of them.  While those who would starve regulatory agencies will 
indeed get less regulation, they will likely end up with more criminal prosecutions as well, in 
cases that might otherwise have been pursued without the threat of prison.  The precise 
distribution of cases in a institutionally richer system is of course uncertain: In the course of its 
regulatory work, an effective ethics commission might kick up evidence of serious offenses 
meriting prosecution – as a result of direct referral by the commission or otherwise – frequently 
enough that we end up with more criminal cases than before.  One can equally imagine fewer 
criminal cases.  The goal here should simply be to create a number of institutional half-way 




                                                 
76
 See Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. Corp. L. 361 (2008). 
77
 See Gail Collins op ed., N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 2010. 
78
 See also Robert A. Kagan, American Legalism: The American Way of Law (2003) (suggesting that even in its 
civil mode, American-style regulation has too much in common with criminal prosecutions). 
 16 
 Consider the citizen seeking recourse for some “wrong,” perhaps done to him, perhaps to 
others; perhaps one for which the law creates a private cause of action, perhaps not.  Although 
the line operator -- the jaded desk sergeant or eye-rolling agent – to whom she brings this 
information may well do exactly nothing with it, a set of positive gatekeeping decisions by 
criminal enforcers will trigger a cascade of publically funded actions that will likely impose 
penal sanctions on the wrongdoer and, should he have any money, recompense for anyone 
actually harmed (via restitution or facilitated civil recovery).  How far would the citizen have to 
look for non-criminal attention, and to what extent will the state subsidize that alternative process?  
Obviously the answer to that question will vary greatly by context and jurisdiction.  And in 
some contexts, because of, say, the nature of the targeted conduct or the value in developing a 
public norm, it might make sense to flatten out the landscape short of criminal sanctions, and 
give the citizen fewer substitutes.
79
  In many others, however, it’s worth thinking more about 
the gap between the satisfaction offered by a prosecution – if enforcers decide to pursue one – 
and that offered by alternatives (which might be as simple as regulatory outreach).  Against the 
obvious net-widening risks whenever opportunities for recourse are increased (more litigation or 
regulatory responses to more complaints), we should weigh the distorting effect that the absence 
of such opportunities has on criminal enforcement. 
  
We have similarly given too little attention to the development of efficient public 
institutions charged with finding facts and inflicting stigma outside of the criminal justice 
process.  Because of defamation laws and the prohibitive cost of civil litigation, a person’s 
criminal record is often the only source of public information about his past; it is certainly the 
most frequently consulted.
80
  The private or public official who wants a record of someone’s 
misdeeds maintained in the public domain will therefore often see criminal prosecution as the 
only solution.  Moreover, civil service or other employment protections can often make it far 
easier (and cheaper for the employer) to have someone prosecuted than to terminate them with 
cause.
81
  This is not to say that libel and employment law don’t have social benefits.  The point 
is simply that these and other institutional limitations of the civil process funnel close cases to 
the criminal side.   
 
Even public discourse has become impoverished.  Consider how many discussions of 
the morality of a public figure’s behavior soon degenerate into arguments about whether the 
behavior constitutes a “crime,” with the implication that what’s not criminal is acceptable.  Or 
how often criminal procedure’s foundational “presumption of innocence” drives debates about a 
                                                 
79
 This may be one justification for the no-drop policies and other such institutions and procedures that have been 
explored in domestic violence cases.  See Andrew R. Klein, Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence 
Research: For Law Enforcement, Prosecutors and Judges (Nat’l Insti. of Justice Report 2009), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/crime/intimate-partner-violence/practical-implications-research/welcome.htm; 
see also Michelle Madden Dempsey, Prosecuting Domestic Violence: A Philosophical Analysis (2009) (exploring 
moral dimensions of prosecutorial policies in this area). 
80
 See Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of Permitting Employer Access to Criminal History Records, 20 J. 
Contemp. Crim. J. 276 (2004). 
81
 See Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will Employment and Just Cause, 
87 Neb. L. Rev. 62, 78-84 (2008). 
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candidate or appointee’s qualifications.
82
  And because recourse to the criminal process leads to 
the underdevelopment of the very noncriminal norms that would condemn behavior without 
declaring it worthy of prosecution, the funnel widens over time. 
 
Jonathan Simon suggests that the state has deployed the rubric of crime itself as a tool of 
governance:  “When we govern through crime, we make crime and the forms of knowledge 
historically associated with it – criminal law, popular crime narrative, and criminology – 
available outside their limited original subject matter domains as powerful tools with which to 
interpret and frame all forms of social action as a problem for governance.”
83
  Perhaps.  Ours 
is indeed a culture that has become all too quick to criminalize what we don’t like. But if we 
decoupled certain criminal enforcement privileges from the criminal label we might substantially 
reduce recourse to the criminal process, and to the sanctions and stigma that attend it.   
 
As Bill has long noted, the degree to which we rely on criminal enforcers to sort out 
conduct that is “really” criminal from that which isn’t challenges standard “rule of law” notions.  
And judges and legislators ought to take on a lot more of this responsibility.  But while we are 
waiting for these reluctant actors, we should give more thought to the socio-legal vacuums that 
criminal enforcers will rush in or be recruited to fill.  Recognizing the degree to which diverse 
institutional and political factors push toward overuse of the criminal process should push us to 
design effective alternatives to it. 
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